In this paper we present a basic but flexible macroeconomic framework with heterogeneous agents -households, firms, banks -which interact through a decentralized matching process presenting common features across four markets -goods, labour, credit and deposit. We study the dynamics of the model by means of computer simulation. Some macroeconomic properties emerge such as endogenous business cycles, nominal GDP growth, unemployment rate fluctuations, the Phillips curve, leverage cycles and credit constraints, bank defaults and financial instability, and the importance of government as an acyclical sector which stabilize the economy. Moreover, we perform some computational experiments on the parameters governing regulatory constraints on the banking sector. Repeated simulations show that if regulation is excessively tight then strong credit constraints emerge, causing high unemployment and a further weakness of economic and financial conditions in a vicious circle. By contrast, if regulatory rules are too loose then an excessive financial risk follows and this may result in bankruptcies avalanches of firms and banks.
Introduction
Our aim is to develop a basic but flexible macroeconomic framework with heterogeneous agents that interact through a decentralized matching process presenting common features across markets. The framework is basic since we propose a minimal macroeconomic model and it is flexible because this baseline setup is thought to be enriched by adding new modules with different agents, markets, and institutions. Indeed, in this paper we propose an agent-based macroeconomic model in which there are three classes of computational agents -households, firms, banks -interacting in four markets -goods, labour, credit and deposit -according to a fully decentralized matching mechanism.
In recent years many economists have developed agent-based models to investigate the working of a macroeconomic system composed of heterogeneous interacting entities (Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006; LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008) . In general, the idea is to start from simple (adaptive) individual behavioral rules and interaction mechanisms in order to reproduce the emergence of aggregate regularities and endogenous crises. In a sense, this is a generative approach according to which we construct the macroeconomy from the "bottom up" (Epstein and Axtell, 1996) . Let's now propose a few examples about agent-based models which set a decentralized matching mechanism in one or more markets in order to reproduce some macroeconomic emergent features. Fagiolo et al. (2004) investigate labor market dynamics and the evolution of aggregate output. In particular, they model a decentralized matching process to describe the interaction between workers and firms in a context characterized by endogenous price formation and stochastic technical progress. Russo et al. (2007) present an agent-based model in which bounded rational firms and workers interact on fully decentralized markets both for final goods and labor. The model is used to analyze the role of fiscal policy in promoting R&D investments that may increase economic growth. This model has been further developed by Gaffeo et al. (2008) through the introduction of a similar matching protocol for the credit market. Cincotti et al. (2010) investigate the interplay between monetary aggregates and the dynamics of output and prices by considering both the credit extended by commercial banks and the money supply created by the central bank. In particular, they study the effects of quantitative easing as a monetary policy. Building upon Dosi et al (2006 Dosi et al ( , 2010 , Dosi et al. (2012) analyze the interplay between income distribution and economic policies. They find that more unequal economies are exposed to more severe business cycles fluctuations, higher unemployment rates, and higher probability of crises. They also find that fiscal policies dampen business cycles, reduce unemployment and the likelihood of large crises, and may affect positively long-term growth.
The major innovations we introduce in the agent-based macroeconomic framework delineated in the literature are the following: (i) we apply a common matching mechanisms to all markets; (ii) we provide an explicit modeling for the deposit market in which banks receive households' saving; and, most importantly, (iii) we introduce a firms' financial structure derived from the Dynamic Trade-Off theory (Flannery and Rangan, 2006) . According to this theory, we hypothesize that firms have a "target leverage", that is a desired ratio between debt and net worth, and they try to reach it by following an adaptive rule governing credit demand. This capital structure is already investigated in the agent-based model proposed by Riccetti et al. (2011) that builds upon the previous work by Delli Gatti et al. (2010) which is based on a firms' capital structure given by the Pecking Order theory (Donaldson, 1961; Myers and Majluf, 1984) . The Dynamic Trade-Off theory has a relevant role in influencing the leverage cycle, with important consequences on macroeconomic dynamics. We propose a different modeling of banks' credit supply with respect to Riccetti et al. (2011) , which allows us to explicitly analyze the effects of credit rationing on economic performance.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we explain the basic aspects of the modeling framework such as the sequence of events and the matching mechanism. Section 3 presents the working of the four markets which composes our economy. The evolution of agents' wealth is described in Section 4, while the behavior of policy makers is discussed in Section 5. Model dynamics are studied in Section 6 in which we report the simulation results. In Section 7 we perform some computational experiments about regulatory constraints on banks' credit supply. Section 8 concludes.
Model setup
The macroeconomy is populated by households (h = 1, 2, ..., H), firms (f = 1, 2, ..., F ), banks (b = 1, 2, ..., B), a central bank, and the government, which interact over a time span t = 1, 2, ..., T in the following four markets:
• Credit market: firms, banks, government and central bank.
• Labor market: firms, households and government.
• Goods market: households and firms.
• Deposit market: banks and households.
Agents are boundedly rational and follow (relatively) simple rules of behaviour in an incomplete and asymmetric information context: households try to buy consumption goods from the cheapest supplier; firms try to accumulate profits by selling their products to households (they set the price according to their individual excess demand) and hiring cheapest workers; workers update the asked wage according to their occupational status (upward if employed, downward if unemployed); households' saving goes into bank deposits; given the Basilea-like regulatory constraints, banks extend credit to finance firms' production; firms choose the banks offering the lowest interest rates, while households deposit money in the banks offering high interest rates. The government hires public workers, taxes private agents and issues public debt. Finally, the central bank provides money to banks and to the government given their requirements.
In the following subsections we firstly describe the sequence of events occurring in each period. Subsequently, we explain the working of the matching mechanism which characterizes the interaction structure of all markets.
Sequence of events
The sequence of events occurring in each period runs as follows:
1. At first firms ask for credit to banks given the demand deriving from their net worth and leverage target. In each period, the leverage level changes according to expected profits and inventories.
2. Banks set their credit supply depending on their net worth, deposits and the quantity of money provided by the central bank. Moreover, they must comply with some regulatory constraints.
3. Banks and firms interact in the credit market. At the end of the matching process, some banks may lend all the available credit supply while others may remain with some residual money; similarly, some firms may obtain the required credit while other may remain credit constrained.
4. The government hires public workers. Moreover, it collects taxes (coming from previous period private incomes and wealth) and, given the wage expenditure for public workers, calculates its deficit (surplus), and updates the overall debt.
5. Banks buy government securities to employ excess liquidity. The central bank purchases the remaining securities.
6. Firms hire workers in the labor market. The labor demand depends on available funds, that is net worth and bank credit. After the labor matching some firms satisfy their labor demand, while others remain with residual cash; at the same time, some people may remain unemployed. Employed people pay income taxes to the government.
7. Firms produce consumption goods on the basis of hired workers. They put in the goods market their current period production and previous period inventories.
8. Households decide their desired consumption on the basis of their wages and wealth (net of taxes).
9. Households and firms interact in the goods market. As a result, some households satisfy their desired consumption, while others may remain with residual cash; on the other hand, some firms sell all the produced output, while others may accumulate inventories.
10. Households determine their savings to be deposited in banks. Banks accept households' savings as deposit depending on their credit supply requirements.
11. Firms calculate profits and survival firms repay their debt to banks, pay taxes, and distribute dividends to households.
12. Banks calculate profits. Households lose (part of) deposited money in case of bank defaults. Survival banks pay taxes and distribute dividends to households.
13. Agents update their wealth, on which they pay capital levy.
14. Central bank decides the amount of money to be lent to banks in the following period according to credit demand/supply unbalance.
15. New entrants replace bankrupted agents (firms or banks) according to a one-toone replacement. New agents enter the system with initial conditions we will define below. Moreover, the money needed to finance entrants is subtract from households' wealth. In the case this is not enough, then government intervenes.
The matching mechanism
In each of the four markets composing our macroeconomy the following matching protocol is at work. In general, two classes of agents interact, that is the demand and the supply sides. One side observes a list of potential counterparts and chooses the most suitable partner according to some market-specific criteria.
At the beginning, a random list of agents in the demand side -firms in the credit market, firms in the labor market, households in the goods market, and banks in the deposit market -is set. Then, the first agent in the list observes a random subset of potential partners, whose size depends on a parameter 0 < χ ≤ 1 (which proxies the degree of imperfect information), and chooses the cheapest one. For example, in the labor market, the first firm on the list, say the firm f 1 observes the asked wage of a subsample of workers and chooses the agent asking for the lowest one, say the worker h 1 . After that, the second agent on the list performs the same activity on a new random subset of the updated potential partner list. In the case of the labor market, the new list of potential workers to be hired no longer contains the worker h 1 . The process iterates till the end of the demand side list (in our example, all the firms enter the matching process and have the possibility to employ one worker). Then, a new random list of agents in the demand side is set and the whole matching mechanism goes on until either one side of the market (demand or supply) is empty or no further matchings are feasible because the highest bid (for example, the money till available to the richest firm) is lower than the lowest ask (for example, the lowest wage asked by till unemployed workers).
Given this matching protocol governing agents' interaction, now we describe the details of agents' behavior in the four markets.
Markets

Credit market
Firms and banks interact in this market: firms want to finance production and banks may provide credit to this end. Firm's f credit demand at time t depends on its net worth A f t and the leverage target l f t . Hence, required credit is:
The leverage target increases if the profit rate is higher than the interest rate paid on bank's loan and if there are not "too many" unsold inventories, while it decreases in the opposite case, according to the following adaptive rule:
(2) where adj > 0 is a parameter representing the maximum percentage change of the relevant variable (in this case the target leverage), U (0, 1) is a random number picked from a uniform distribution in the interval (0,1), π f t−1 is the gross profit (realized in the previous period), B f t−1 is the previous period effective debt, i f t−1 is the nominal interest rate paid on previous debts 1 ,ŷ f t−1 represents inventories (that is, unsold goods), 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1 is a parameter representing a threshold for inventories based on previous period production y f t−1 .
On the other side, bank b offers a total amount of money B d bt depending on net worth A bt , deposits D bt , central bank credit m bt , and some legal constraints (proxied by the parameters reg1 > 0 and 0 ≤ reg2 ≤ 1 that represents respectively the maximum admissible leverage and maximum percentage of capital to be invested in lending activities):
where k1 = reg1 · A bt , k2 = reg2 · A bt + D bt−1 + m bt . However, in order to reduce risk concentration, only a fraction 0 < reg3 ≤ 1 of the total amount of the credit B d bt can be lent to a single firm.
The interest rate charged by the bank b on the firm f at time t is given by:
where i CBt is the nominal interest rate set by the central bank at time t, i1 bt is a bank-specific component, and i2 f t = ρ l f t /100 is a firm-specific component, that is a risk premium on firm target leverage and ρ > o is a risk aversion parameter. The bank-specific component evolves as follows:
whereB bt−1 is the amount of money that the bank did not manage to lend to firms in the previous period.
Given this setting on credit supply and demand, firms and banks interact according to the matching mechanism. As a consequence, each firm ends up with a credit B f t ≤ B d f t and each bank lends to firms an amount B bt ≤ B d bt . The difference between desired and effective credit is equal to
for firms and banks respectively. Moreover, we hypothesize that banks ask for an investment in government securities equal to P D d bt = k2 bt − B bt . If the sum of desired government bonds exceeds the amount of outstanding public debt then the effective investment P D bt is rescaled according to a factor P D d bt / P D d bt . Instead, if public debt exceeds the banks' desired amount, then the central bank buys the difference.
Labor market
In each period, the government hires a fraction pw of households. The remaining part is available for working in the firms. Firm's f labor demand depends on the total capital available: A f t + B f t . Each worker posts a wage w ht which is updated according to the following rule:
However, the required wage has a minimum related to the mean price of a single good (net of income tax).
Given this setting on labor supply and demand, firms and households interact according to the matching mechanism. As a consequence, each firm ends up with a number of workers n f t and a residual cash (insufficient to hire an additional worker). Obviously, a fraction of households may remain unemployed. The wage of unemployed people is set equal to zero.
Goods market
In this market households represent the demand side, while firms are the supply side. Households set the desired consumption as follows:
where 0 < c1 ≤ 1 is the propensity to consume current income, 0 ≤ c2 ≤ 1 is the propensity to consume the wealth A ht . If the amount c d ht is smaller than the average price of one goodp then c d ht = min(p , w ht + A ht ). Firm f produces an amount of goods given by:
where φ ≥ 1 is a productivity parameter.
The firm tries to sell this produced amount plus the inventoriesŷ f t−1 . The selling price increases if the firm sold all the output in the previous period (that is, it has no inventories), while it decreases in the opposite case (or with no production), according to this rule: 1) ) , ifŷ f t−1 = 0 and y f t−1 > 0 1) ) , ifŷ f t−1 > 0 or y f t−1 = 0 (9) However, the minimum price is set such that it is at least equal to the average cost of production.
Given this setting on goods supply and demand, households and firms interact according to the matching mechanism. As a consequence, each household ends up with a residual cash, that is not enough to buy an additional good and that she will try to deposit in a bank. On the other hand, firms sell an amount 0 ≤ȳ f t ≤ y f t and they may remain with unsold goods (that is, the inventoriesŷ f t = y f t +ŷ f t−1 −ȳ f t that the firm will try to sell in the next period).
Deposit market
In the deposit market, banks represent the demand side (because they require capital to extend credit) and households are on the supply side. Banks offer an interest rate on deposits according to their funds requirement:
where P D bt is the amount of public debt bought by bank b at time t. Hence, the previous equation states that if a bank exhausts the credit supply by lending to private firms or government then it decides to increase the interest rate paid on deposits, so to attract new depositors, and viceversa. However, the interest rate on deposits can increase till a maximum given by the policy rate r CBt which is the rate at which banks could refinance from the central bank (and the rate paid by the government on public bonds in the baseline model).
Households set the minimum interest rate they want to obtain on bank deposits as follows:
where D ht−1 is the household h's deposit in the previous period. This means that a household that found a bank paying an interest rate higher or equal to the desired one decides to ask for a higher remuneration. In the opposite case, she did not find a bank satisfying her requirements, thus she kept her money in cash and now she asks for a lower rate. We hypothesize that a household deposits all the available money in a single bank that offers an adequate interest rate. A household that decides to not deposit her money in a bank signals a preference for liquidity, because she does not accept to deposit her cash for an interest rate below the desired one.
Wealth evolution 4.1 Firms
According to the outcomes of the credit, labor and goods markets, the firm f 's profit is equal to:
where wb f t is the firm f 's wage bill, that is the sum of wages paid to employed workers, and int f t is the sum of interests paid on bank loans. Firms pay a proportional tax τ on positive profits; negative profits will be subtracted from the next positive profits. We indicate net profits withπ f t . Finally, firms pay a percentage δ f t as dividends on positive net profits. The fraction 0 ≤ δ f t ≤ 1 decreases if the firm sold all the produced output, while it increases in the opposite case (or with no production) evolves according to the following rule: 1) ) , ifŷ f t = 0 and y f t > 0 δ f t−1 · (1 + adj · U (0, 1)) , ifŷ f t > 0 or y f t = 0 (13)
We indicate the profit net of taxes and dividends asπ f t . Obviously, in case of negative profitsπ f t = π f t . Thus, the firm f 's net worth evolves as follows:
where τ ′ is the tax rate on wealth (applied only on wealth exceeding a threshold tau ′ ·p, that is a multiple of the average goods price).
If A f t ≤ 0 then the firm goes bankrupt and a new entrant takes its place. The initial net worth of the new entrant is a multiple of the average goods price, while the leverage is one. Moreover, the initial price asked by the new entrant is equal to the mean price of survival firms.
Banks
As a consequence of operations in credit and deposit markets, the bank b's profit is equal to:
where int bt represents the interests gained on lending to non-defaulted firms, i P D t is the interest rate on government securities (P D bt ), and bad bt is the amount of "bad debt" due to bankrupted firms, that is non performing loans. Bad debt is the loss given default of the total loan, that is a fraction 1 − (A f t + B f t )/B f t of the loan to defaulted firm f connected with bank b. Banks pay a proportional tax τ on positive profits; negative profits will be subtracted from the next positive profits. We indicate net profits withπ bt . Finally, banks pay a percentage δ bt as dividends on positive net profits. The fraction 0 ≤ δ bt ≤ 1 evolves according to the following rule:
Indeed, if the bank does not manage to lend the desired supply of credit then it decides to distribute more dividends (because it does not need high reinvested profits), and viceversa.
We indicate the profit net of taxes and dividends asπ bt . Obviously, in case of negative profitsπ bt = π bt . Thus, the bank b's net worth evolves as follows:
where τ ′ is the tax rate on wealth (applied only on wealth exceeding a thresholdτ ′ ·p, that is a multiple of the average goods price).
If A bt ≤ 0 then the bank is in default and a new entrant takes its place. The initial net worth of the new entrant is a multiple of the average goods price. Moreover, the initial bank-specific component of the interest rate (i1 bt ) is equal to the mean value across banks.
Households
According to the outcomes of the labor, goods, and deposit markets, the household h's wealth evolves as follows:
where τ ′ is the tax rate on wealth (applied only on wealth exceeding a thresholdτ ′ ·p, that is a multiple of the average goods price), τ is the tax rate on income, w ht is the wage gained by employed workers, div ht is the fraction (proportional to the household h's wealth compared to overall households' wealth) of dividends distributed by firms and banks net of the amount of resources needed to finance new entrants (hence, this value may be negative), int D ht represents interests on deposits, and c ht ≤ c d ht is the effective consumption.
Government and central bank
On the one hand, the government's current expenditure is given by the sum of wages paid to public workers (P W t ), the interests paid on public debt to banks (P D t ), and an amount Ω t which is normally zero but for extreme cases in which the government has to intervene to finance new entrants when households wealth is not enough. On the other hand, government collects taxes on incomes and wealth, and receives interests gained by the central bank. The difference between expenditures and revenues is the public deficit P DEF t . Consequently, public debt is P D t = P D t−1 + P DEF t .
Central bank decides the policy rate i CBt . Moreover, the central bank observes the aggregate excess supply or demand in the credit market and sets an amount of money M t to reduce the gap in the following period. As already said, the central bank buys the public debt not purchased by banks. 
Simulations
We run a baseline simulation for a time span of T =150 periods and analyse the results for the last 100 (so the first 50 are used to initialise the model). Table 1 shows the parameter setting of the baseline simulation. The initial agents' wealth is set as follows: A f 1 = max{0.1, N (3, 1)}, A b1 = max{0.2, N (5, 1)}, A h1 = max{0.01, N (0.5, 0.01)}, where N (µ, σ) is a normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ. The policy rate i CBt is constant at 1% and equal to the interest rate i P Dt paid by the government to banks (and central bank).
Simulation results are displayed in Figure 1 and show that endogenous business cycles emerge as a consequence of the interaction between real and financial factors. When firms' profits are improving, they try to expand the production and, if banks extend the required credit, this results in more employment; the decrease of the unemployment rate leads to the rise of wages that, on the one hand, increases the aggregate demand, while on the other hand reduces firms' profits, and this may cause the inversion of the business cycle. Banks' capitalization plays a relevant role in determining credit conditions, so influencing firms' leverage and, in general, the macroeconomic evolution. The presence of an acyclical sector, here represented by the government, has a fundamental role in sustaining the aggregate demand and in mitigating output volatility.
The nominal GDP grows along time as a consequence of price inflation (given that there is no productivity growth in the baseline model). The average inflation rate is 2.06% with a minimum of 0.82% and a maximum of 3.19%. The unemployment rate oscillates around 8.2% with a minimum of 3.8% and a maximum of 13.6%. Model simulation reproduces a Phillips curve, that is a negative relationship between wage inflation and unemployment rate (the correlation coefficient is -0.82). The average number of firm defaults is 3.96 while at most there are 13 bankruptcies (on the other hand, in some periods there are no defaults). There are also 2 bank defaults. Bank's leverage is inversely related to bank's net worth. The per-capita average banks' net worth (in real terms) is 13.74 (min 9.95, max 19.34) . Moreover, credit mismatch (that is the difference between banks' credit supply and firms' credit demand) tends to follow the cycle of banks' net worth: when banks are poorly capitalised this results in credit rationing for firms; in this case, the central bank intervenes providing credit to banks; on the contrary, when banks are well capitalised they are able to fulfill all credit demand. Accordingly, firms' average leverage is influenced by credit availability. The mean interest rate charged by banks on firm loans is 7.72%. Per-capita households wealth (in real terms) is stable around 2.05 (min 1.96, max 2.12), while the same value for firms is equal to 3.42 (min 2.72, max 4.08). Finally, the average ratio between public deficit and GDP is equal to 3.13% (min 2.06%, max 4.37%). It is worth to note that the presence of the government, nevertheless the relatively low level of public deficit, allows for the nominal growth in the model.
Policy experiments
In this section we perform some computational experiments regarding the regulatory constraints on bank credit, that is reg1 and reg3. We replicate the simulation 50 times changing the value of the parameter under analysis, keeping unchanged all the other parameters. 2
Maximum bank leverage
The first experiment consists in simulating the model for different values of reg1: from 1 to 50 with step 1. Figure 2 shows that for very small values of the parameter reg1, that is when the maximum bank leverage is forced to be very low, a large credit mismatch follows so resulting in a credit rationing which impedes firms to fully finance production. As a consequence, the mean rate of unemployment is high. This leads to an overall weakness of the economic and financial system, as shown by the very high number of firm and bank defaults. Firms' failure increases bad debt and damages bank capitalisation which in turn reinforces the credit constraint in a vicious circle. Instead, when reg1 increases the credit mismatch reduces or disappears, so mitigating the credit constraint on firms. The number of firm bankruptcies and the unemployment rate come back to the baseline simulation values. However, the number of bank defaults displays a tendency to rise as reg1 grows above 4. Indeed, the average number of bank defaults per period is equal to: 2.84 for 1 ≤ reg1 ≤ 3, 0.46 for 4 ≤ reg1 ≤ 20, 0.59 for 21 ≤ reg1 ≤ 35, and 0.74 for 36 ≤ reg1 ≤ 50. This may be a signal of mounting financial instability (as indicated by the high volatility of the unemployment rate associated to the largest values of reg1: the coefficient of variation is indeed higher than 0.7 for reg1 ≥ 49 while its average level in the remaining simulations is around 0.25). Figure 3 shows that for small values of reg3 there is a relevant credit rationing which causes many firm defaults and high rate of unemployment. As the parameter grows, while remaining low, the credit mismatch reduces or disappears and a reduction of firm defaults and unemployment follow. For increasing values of reg3, the riskiness of the financial system tends to increase, as shown by the growing number of bank defaults. This induces a slight increase of the mean rate of unemployment. When the constraint becomes too loose, system's financial fragility is excessive and this can lead to large bankruptcy avalanches of firms and banks. As a consequence, banks' net worth collapses resulting in a strong credit constraint. At the same time, firms are not able to hire workers because their net worth also falls down and they do not receive credit from the banking system. Credit crunches result in large unemployment rates, as shown by the three hikes in all the subplots of Figure 3 .
Bank lending concentration
Concluding remarks and future research
We present an agent-based macroeconomic model in which heterogeneous agents (households, firms and banks) interact according to a fully decentralized matching mechanism. The matching protocol is common to all markets (goods, labor, credit, deposits) and represents a best partner choice in a context of imperfect information.
Model simulation shows that decentralized interactions among heterogeneous entities give rise to emergent macroeconomic properties like the growth of nominal GDP, the fluctuation of the unemployment rate, the presence of the Phillips curve, the relevance of leverage cycles and credit constraints on economic performance, the presence of bank defaults and the role of financial instability, and the importance of government in providing a quote of the aggregate demand and then as an acyclical sector which stabilize the economy.
Our modeling framework can be useful to understand the effects of some policy or institutional changes. Indeed, we perform some computational experiments on the parameters governing regulatory constraints on the banking sector. Repeated simulations show that if regulation is excessively tight then strong credit constraints emerge causing high unemployment and a further weakness of economic and financial conditions in a vicious circle. By contrast, if regulatory rules are too loose then an excessive financial risk follows and this may result in bankruptcies avalanches of firms and banks. This is strongly relevant when regulation allows for high risk concentration, that is when banks do not diversify enough their portfolios.
In future developments we will analyse the role of other parameters, so to investigate the effect of fiscal and monetary policies, labor market rigidity, heterogeneous consumption behavior, etc. Moreover, the baseline model presented in this paper will be enriched by adding modules as the interbank market, the stock and bond markets (allowing agents to decide their portfolio allocation), and long-run growth factors (heterogeneous workers' skills, R&D investments, etc.).
